This is the translation of an article first published on Modellismo Piu.
This article covers
the aerial operations during the Italian Campaign of Greece in 1940/41. Of
interest are several references to historical documents and letters.
On 28 October
1940, the beginning of operations in Greek territory, Comando
Aeronautico Albania della Regia Aeronautica was based at Tirana,
Albania and had at its disposition 38° Stormo da
bombardamento at Valona with SM.81s, 105° Gruppo
da bombardamento at Tirana with SM.79s and 160° Gruppo Caccia CT (Fighter Squadron) with two squadrons of Fiat CR.32s
at Drenova and
the 72° Gruppo Osservazione
Aerea providing
aerial observation with the IMAM Ro.37 composed of the 25°, 42° and 120° Sq. based
at Coriza, Valona and Argirocastro. On 5 November these small forces were
increased with the addition of the 104° Gruppo da bombardamento
at Tirana with SM.79s
and the 24° and 154° Gruppo Caccia
CT operating from Berati with two squadrons of Fiat G.50s
and the 150° Gruppo Caccia with
363°, 364° and 365° Sq. each equipped with the Fiat CR.42 at Tirana, Valona and Argirocastro. In all on
5 November, the Regia Aeronautica could support the movements of the Regio Esercito with the following
forces in Albania:
31 SM79
24 SM81
47 Fiat G50
46 FIAT CR42
14 FIAT CR32
25 IMAM Ro37
In Puglia
Italy, maritime forces that could participate in the invasion of Greece included
the 4° Zona Aerea Territoriale which would eventually
become the 4° Squadra Aerea with the 35° Stormo da bombardamento marittimo (Maritime
Bombers) using the Cant
Z. 506 based at Brindisi. On land, 37° Stormo da
Bombardamento with SM.81s and
Fiat BR.20s were at Lecce, the 47° Stormo da bombardamento at Grottaglie with the CANT Z.1007 bis, and the famous "Picchiatelli"
of the 96° Gruppo bombardameto
a tuffo at Lecce with
Junkers Ju87B/R2. Fighter cover was
provided by the 2° Gruppo Caccia
with Fiat G.50s and Fiat CR.42s with the two squadrons 150a and 152a Sq. at Grottaglie and Bari. The 41° Gruppo
da bombardamento with CANT Z.1007 Bis and the 372 Squadriglia Caccia with Macchi MC.200s were based at
Brindisi. In total airbases in Puglia could support operations in
Greece with the following forces:
60 CANT Z.1007bis
23 CANT Z.506
20 Ju.87B/R2
12 Macchi MC.200
33 FIAT G.50
9 FIAT CR32
In total, from
airbases bases in Albania and Puglia there were 135 bombers,
151 fighters and 25 reconnaissance aircraft.
Greece could not oppose this air
force on equal footing. The fighters available to the Greek Air Force included 36
PZL P24F of Polish design divided into three Squadrons the 21st, 22nd and 23rd
with ten aircraft each and in which the defense of Salonicco,
Kastoria, Kozane and Larisa were entrusted.
There were 9 Bloch MB.151 of French design equipping the 31st Squadron
to protect Athens. Greek bombers included 9 modern French designed Potez 633 equipping the 31st Squadron, 12 Bristol Blenheim Mk I equipping 32nd
Squadron and 10 Fairey Battle Mk I equipping the 33rd
Squadron. Reconnaissance units were equipped with 16 German Henschel
Hs.126 and the navy had 10 Avro Ansons
and 9 obsolete fighter biplanes, the Fairey IIIF.
On paper the
disparity was remarkable, not just in quality, but even the modern equipment
such as the Potez and the Bloch were hardly available
due to pilot training and limited supplies of spare parts. Thus the Regia expected
to sweep the Greek Air Force in a maximum of 5 days and then concentrate its
support on army operations undisrupted, however this did not happen, and until
the German participation the combined Greek and British Air Forces continued to
harass the Regia Aeronautica.
As mentioned in
a previous article on the campaign in Greece
(http://modellismo.lineaweb.net/modules/news08/article.php?storyid=25), the
Regia Aeronautica and the Regia Marina were held outside of operations planning
and consequently Superaereo received
"enigmatic" demands such as the letter of Benini
Undersecretary of State for Albanian Operations Planning to the Gen. Pricolo Chief of the General Staff of the Regia Aeronautica
dated 6 September 1940:
"6
September 1940 : n. 195520/2784 – Dear Pricolo, please
be informed of preparations to be carried out at the soonest possible moment
for signed actions against Albanian territories subject to Greece (I emphasize
the "signed action" n.d.r.), the points are
summarized as follows:
a) to prepare air borne units for air assaults on Ciamuria and to prepare the necessary units with arms and
supplies.
b) have the R.Ministero dell'Aeronautica study the possibility of
the use of air borne units to assault Ciamuria. To
such a purpose it is suggested to rapidly train Albanians who wish to join such an action. On the whole the Ecc. Ciano has approved of such proposals, provided they are
thought feasible from the R.Ministero dell'Aeronautica. Please let me know your
thoughts - Affez.mo Benini."
"6 Settembre 1940 - n. 195520/2784 - Caro Pricolo, nel
programma che si và preparando per essere pronti in ogni eventualità , a
svolgere la nota azione contro le regioni albanesi soggette alla Grecia
(sottolineo il "nota azione" n.d.r.) sono stati compresi i seguenti
punti:
a) approntare dei paracadute per lasciar cadere in Ciamuria, in
località convenienti. armi e munizioni.
b) Far studiare dal R.Ministero dell'Aeronautica la possibilità di approntare
un reparto di paracadutisti destinato ad operare eventualmente in Ciamuria. A
tale proposito si suggerisce di costituire un rapido corso d'addestramento per
Albanesi che desiderassero unirsi a tale azione.
In linea di massima l'Ecc. Ciano ha approvato tali proposte, sempre che esse
siano ritenute attuabili dal R.Ministero dell'aeronautica. Mi fò premura perciò
d'informartene e ti sarò grato se vorrai farmi conoscere il tuo pensiero al
riguardo.- Affez.mo Benini."
To such a
strange letter, Pricolo replied of only knowing of indirect
ways of attacking Greece and that while he thought
feasible the plan of an airborne drop of troops and ammunition, he expressed strong
doubts on the ultimate effectiveness of such an operation. Fortunately the operation did not come to
pass due to time and cost constraints. On 9 September Superesercito
officially
contacted Supermarina and Superaereo in order to agree to operations against Epiro and the Joniche islands and
on 12 September was transmitted the following letter:
“ ...... 1 – OPERATIONS
AGAINST the YUGOSLAVIA (Emergency "E")
the political situation in Jugoslava requires the
operations be executed swiftly as indicated by the Duce. Therefore by the end
of October the operations must be completed so as to be in a position to profit
from the eventual internal turmoil in Jugoslava.
2- OPERATIONS
AGAINST GREECE (Emergency "G") We must
consider the possibility of an armed intervention in order to occupy the Ciammuria, Epiro and the Joniche islands. The transport of troops must be carried
out by the end of September........."
To gain their
first successful campaign the Army wanted to be sure that Air Force and Navy played
only a marginal part and informed their two respective general staffs only at
the last possible moment. In mid October 1940 at Tirana, HQ did not fully
understand the condition of some of its airfields for example at Valona, Durazzo and Argirocastro there did not exist lodging and shelter for
staff and ostensibly referred to existing barracks as an "air
terminal". The fuel reservoirs amounted 1500 drums, spare parts were
insufficient, there was only 2500 tons of ammunition, some
supplies of clothing, a few motor vehicles and only a single unit of engineers at
Tirana. Outside those airfields equipped with telegraphic or telephone lines, communications
were conducted via radio or via aerial courier. Radiometric assistance was done
from Brindisi,
Italy. Moreover efforts of
shipment of material from the mother land were hampered due to sinkings by Royal Navy submarines which sunk the Chisone, Hermada and Olympia cargo ships with precious communications
equipment, fuel and supplies.
The choice of
the date for the beginning of operations was particularly unfortunate, the start
of winter which benefited the Greeks tremendously: Until 1 November the weather
was so bad to render what ever type of flight activity impossible and on 2
November with weather worsening the Albanian air fields were reduced to marshes
and therefore, bombers and ground attack aircraft operating from Puglia
alternated themselves on important objectives such as the Corinto
canal, the railway port of Salonicco and the ports of
Corfù, Kastoria and Gianina without appreciable results. On 3 November "strategic
targets" had to be abandon and Italian bombers were employed on secondary targets
in an attempt to check the Greek counter-offensive. The engagement of Italian pilots was
remarkable during this time, according to various sources flying as many as 200
to 400 sorties in a single day. All Ju.87s
available were diverted to the Greek Front at the cost of neglecting the important
task of anti-shipping and attacking Allied supply convoys directed toward Libia, tasks in which they were more adapted to. The SM.79
and the CANT Z.1007 could do little not having true targets to strike. On 2 November Greek P24Fs shot down an SM.81
to the north of Giannina. In the succeeding days,
Italian bombers bombed Greek supply lines losing 2 Cant Z.1007bis, a SM.79 and
a CR.42, against the loss of a P24F. On 15 November all missions were concentrated
on Corciano. Although the few Greek
bombers did little damage and with a sacristy of forces they found the courage
to push their attacks to Bari although enduring
very serious losses. British reinforcements arrived at Valona on
15 November with 6 Vickers Wellingtons and without escort attacked and were intercepted
by Fiat G.50s losing four planes, two shot down and two that forced landed. The
British supported the Greek counter offensive with the 33rd Fighter
Squadron composed of Gloster Gladiators and the 30th
Bomber Squadron composed of Bristol Blenheims. At the
end of the month Blenheims of the 84th and
the 211th Squadrons arrived together with the 80th and the 112th Squadrons of Gladiators.
The weather conditions
worsened and up to the beginning of December the few remaining SM.81s were transferred
to Lecce where they were converted to
transports in order to try to alleviate the situation regarding fuel supplies that
was becoming dramatic. Other aircraft
were transferred to air bases in Puglia or were concentrated on
the Albanian air fields of Berati, Devoli, Argirocastro and Tirana
again to deal with fuel shortages. In Puglia on 23 November arrived
Macchi MC.200s of the 373° and 374° Sq. arriving from Veneto to Bari. There were 27 SM 79 of the 42° Stormo at Grottaglie and at Lecce 14 Ju.87Bs of 97° Gruppo
Tuffatori and 8 MC 200s of
the 370° Sq. were transferred to Foggia. The 95° Stormo transformed to a land unit abandoning its CANT Z.506s
for the CANT Z.1007, while 12 SM.79s and 21 Fiat G50s were transferred to Libya. The first large scale
engagement between the Regia Aeronautica and the RAF occurred on 19 November
when 20 Gladiators of the 80° Squadron clashed with 5 Fiat CR.42s shooting down
4. On the 27 November 7 Gladiators attacked 3 CR.42s shooting down 1 CR.42, and
the day after, another duel in which 4 Gladiators were shot down for the lose
of 3 CR.42s. Aerial combat intensified
to the end of the month with about 20 or 30 aircraft lost on each side before
the forced pause of December. During this time the Italian pilots were gallant
and in those few days in which weather permitted, never did the RA respite in
carrying out close support of ground troops when it was required. For example the pilots of the 97° Sq. on 9
December succeeded in carrying out 23
missions/day/crew with a total of 150 sorties without suffering any losses while
slowing down the Greek counter-offensive each time, and giving a much need
break to Italian troops in which the front was less than twenty minutes flying
time from Italian airfields.
In February
1941 with an improvement in weather conditions, air combat between the Regia
Aeronautica and the RAF resumed. On 9
February, 24 CR.42s escorting BR20s met with a mixed formation of Gladiators
and PZLs, both sides losing two fighters each. On 13
February, 12 Blenheims on a mission to Tepeleni were attacked by 12 G.50s with five Blenheims shot down. On 20 February arrived the first
Hurricanes. At the beginning of March SM.81s of 38° Stormo
were replaced by BR.20s. The CR.42s of
150° Gruppo were replaced by
MC.200s. Also arrived were 12 Ju.87Bs at Valona as
well as 32 Macchi MC.200s and 8 Ro.37s. On 4 March, 11 CR.42s attacked a
formation of Blenheims protected by Hurricanes and in
the ensuing clash two CR.42s were shot down for the
loss of one Hurricane. Between the 9 and 14 March losses included 2 MC.200s, a
Gladiator and a Hurricane. On the 16 March, 2 Wellingtons were shot down at Tirana.
On 22 March the RA executed a surprise attack on the Greek air port of Paramythia in which two Blenheims and a Wellington were destroyed on the
ground. In sight of the impending invasion of Yugoslavia, on 2 April at Tirana
arrived 9 Ju.87Bs of 208° Squadriglia, 9 Caproni
CA.311 of the 87a Squadriglia Osservazione Aerea and an equal number of Ro.37 of the 35° Sq.
On 6 April the German
participation in the Balkans began with VIII FliegerKorps
of Luftflotte 4 in Bulgaria commencing attacks in
Greece and Yugoslavia with Ju.87Bs of the I and III St.G, Messerschmitt Me 109Es of the II and III JG.27
and Me 110Cs of the II/ZG26. Reconnaissance
was provided by Hs.126 and Storch of the I(H)/4, transport was provided by Ju.52s of the IV/KGzbVI. Other units in Austria, Hungary and Sicily were ready. The Jugoslava air force was rendered ineffectual in 48 hours and
for the Greeks things didn’t go much better in which a (un)fortunate
blow on a ship loaded with 250 tons of explosive was hit by a Ju.87 and completely
devastated the port of Athens sinking 10 ships with a
single bomb. On the 9 April, the Germans
were at Salonicco and after 5 days the Greek Air Force
ceased operations, 113° Squadron of the RAF was destroyed on the ground and the
same fate awaited the remaining RAF air bases.
On the evening of 14 April the RAF could count only 35 aircraft in
flying condition. German losses up to this point were only two fighters! On 6
April CANT Z.1007s attacked the port of Mostar in Yugoslavia losing one aircraft while
shooting down two, at Spalato one Ju.87B was lost. On
the 13 April 300 fighters and bombers of
the Regia Aeronautica attacked Mostar and the arsenal
of the Cattaro, losing one Ju.87B. On the 26 April
the last day of the Greek campaign, 13 Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground
by Me.110s thus destroying the final elements of the RAF in Greece. The next day came the signing of the
armistice. For the Regia Aeronautica the strategic task ended and now began the
equally hard task of anti-guerrilla.
I suppose a small
analysis is worthwhile of the statistics of the operations carried out during
the campaign, beginning from the days available for the missions in relation to
the time of operations:
November, 17
days up to the 31st November
December 14
days up to the 31st December
January 10 days
up to the 31st Jnauary
February 9 days
of 28th February
March 25 days
up to the 31st March
April 11 of 22 days.
Also when it
rained the cloud ceiling remained quite low and so rendered impossible for
bombers to identify targets accurately and consequently to act in order to
avoid collateral damage. Thus reduced about half the
effective employable aircraft in actions that were of some war value. An
idea of the conditions of airbases in Albanian is provided in the following letter
dated 28 October 1940:
"Tirana:
reduced 700X200 wet. - new Scutari:
PROHIBITED. - Drenova: PROHIBITED. - Coritza: reduced 500X300, flooded, PROHIBITED HEAVY. Valona: reduced 900X300 wet, bad. - BERAT: PROHIBITED. - PROHIBITED Devoli."
On the first day
of the Greek Campaign there was only a single airfield available of seven! Its interesting to note that Papagos
mentions clearly in his book "Greece at War" that hundreds
of Italian Aircraft swarmed the skies on the 28 October
1940 in support of
ground operations. I would like to know
from where these supposed hundreds of aircraft had taken off from? In all, the
Regia Aeronautica carried out 7777 missions bombing missions of which 5560 were
tactical support, with total bombs dropped equaling 4547 tons, of this load 3539
tons were dropped by Italian Ju.87s. The activities of transport and refueling
were quite notable, above all airborne drops of fuel totaled 200 tons to
isolated units, often with antiquated aircraft whose crews accepted missions
without fighter support and metrological equipment. It can be said the Regia
Aeronautica played a critical role in allowing the Italians to successfully
reform their lines in Albania. The cooperation between
the Army and the Air force was at times strained and can be summarized in the
following letter dated 15 January 1941 addressed to Rome:
"Letter
021202 from Armed Forces High Command FFAA Albania and p.c. to the Aeronautical
Command in Albania: Please note the general
situation and in particular the operations of our troops and the enemies, and
draw attention to the following facts:
1) impossibility of counter offensives due to the remarkable
and tenacious efforts of the enemies rested troops who are at peak efficiency; the
lack of availability of Italian reserves for continued field operations.
2) deficiency of the availability of medium-caliber guns and
artillery and the near absence of long range artillery.
3) serious deficiencies in the means of transport that for a long
time has rendered the re-supply and refueling of our troops at long distances problematic
or impossible, thus limiting offensive operations.
4) material conditions of combat units for long months go
unanswered and are having serious repercussions on moral.
All this has
induced me to request the air arm all that it is capable of to help remedy this
situation. Although the air arm has conducted itself with the maximum spirit of
sacrifice and dedication to the common cause; it turns out the results are less
than expected.
Areas of
concern:
a) the lack of timeliness
of the participation.
b) the lack operating necessities
in action.
The first cause
is easily understood, knowing the procedures and the demands for participation.
In the second case I will say instead that the understanding of the operating
necessities is a result to which detailed study can only be reached through one
and to one exact appraisal of the our situation and that of the enemy; in such
appraisal the understanding of the particular conditions of the actions and of
the material employed by the staff enter into question. Now I also believe that
the close cooperation of the air arm with the land forces can not occur if such
conditions lack. In order to obtain the best results the Commander of the Air
forces is destined to concur in the tactical field and should reside at the
side of he who leads the action. In this way both the commander of the air
would benefit from understanding clearly the necessities of ground operations
and vice versa. The air arm would better be able to succeed in carrying out immediate
actions at vital points at the front at opportune moments. In order to obtain
close cooperation between the two armed services, I propose the following:
a) put under the direct control of the Army, air units that are
located near the center of the Armed Command of: one squadron of Junkers Ju.87
and a group of G.50s.
b) that the commander of these forces resides with the Comando
d'Armata under my direct
control."
"Lettera 021202 dal Comando superiore FFAA Albania e p.c. al
Comando Aeronautico Albania:
Nota la situazione generale e particolare delle truppe operanti nostre e del
nemico, ritengo opportuno richiamare in modo particolare l'attenzione sui
seguenti fattori negativi:
1) impossibilità di contrapporre validamente agli sforzi notevoli e tenaci del
nemico truppe riposate ed in piena efficienza, impossibilità derivante dalla
mancata disponibilità di riserve sia nel campo delle P.U. che in quello della
G.U. in prima schiera.
2) deficienza della disponibilità delle artiglierie di medio calibro ed assenza
quasi completa di quelle a lunga gittata.
3) grave deficienza dei mezzi di trasporto che per lungo tempo ha reso
problematico od impossibile il rifornimento per le truppe dislocate a grande
distanza dalle rotabili di alta quota.
4) condizioni materiali dei Reparti combattenti da lunghi mesi, troppo note per
essere ancora poste in evidenza, e che hanno serie ripercussioni sul morale.
Tutto ciò mi ha indotto a chiedere all'Arma Aerea tutto il concorso di cui è
capace.
Tale concorso è stato concesso in misura piu' larga e condotto con il massimo spirito
di sacrificio e di dedizione alla causa comune; ma i risultati ottenuti rare
volte sono stai quelli desiderati e che forse avrebbero potuto essere
raggiunti.
Ciò si deve:
a) alla mancanza di tempestività dell'intervento.
b) alla mancanza di aderenza alle necessità operative in atto.
La prima causa è facilmente intuibile, conoscendo la procedura da
osservarsi per la richiesta di intervento.
Nei riguardi della seconda dirò invece che l'aderenza alle necessità operative
è un risultato al quale si può pervenire solo attraverso uno studio
particolareggiato ed ad una esatta valutazione della situazione nostra e del
nemico; in tale valutazione entrano in gioco la conoscenza perfetta
dell'ambiente particolare della lotta e quella materiale del personale impiegato.
Ora io credo che l'intervento dell'aviazione in stretta ed intima cooperazione
con le forze terrestri non può condurre ai risultati voluti, pure attraverso i
sacrifici dei camerati dell'aria se mancano tali condizioni.
Per ottenere ciò è a mio avviso, indispensabile che il Comandante delle Forze
Aeree destinate a concorrere in campo tattico, risieda al fianco di chi conduce
l'azione.
Non vi è dubbio che il Comandante delle Forze Aeree destinate a concorrere in
campo tattico, acquisterebbe in tal guisa un perfetto spirito di comprensione,
potendo constatare di persona le molteplici pressanti necessità delle truppe di
terra e che la realizzazione del concorso dell'Arma Aerea ne riuscirebbe
notevolmente avvantaggiata per tempestività d'intervento e risultati.
Si riuscirebbe a portare con sicurezza l'offesa nei punti vitali del nemico nel
momento opportuno, con economie di forze nei riguardi del materiale e del
personale.
Allo scopo di giungere a questa ancora piu' intima cooperazione, rappresento
l'opportunità:
a) che siano messe a disposizione diretta dell'Armata le seguenti unità da
dislocarsi nei campi vicini alla sede del Comando di Armata: una squadriglia di
Junkers ed un gruppo di G50.
b) che il comandante di questo complesso di forze risieda del Comando d'Armata
a mia diretta disposizione."
According to
this letter Aerial Command and not the army was at fault since it did not acquire the proper knowledge
of land operations. Was it necessary for Air Command to be always present and how
if the action developed in two various places? If the task of the Air Arm was
to attack and to destroy the enemy on the ground, the army had to establish
where. Would the Regia Aeronautica make up for the deficiencies the army lacked
in reserves, refueling, guns and thus raise the moral of the troops? Enough of my comments.
However whatever
mistakes there were are not entirely one sided and Comando Aeronautico
is partly to blame as it did not do
enough to assure valid communications with the other branches, even if the
other branches we’re ostensibly unwilling to cooperate.
Giulio Gobbi, Roma, Italy, Modellismo
Piu
REFERENCES:
[1] AA.VV. -
MACH1 Encyclopedia of Vol.4 Aviation - EDIPEM Giuseppe Santoro - the Italian
Air Force in the Second World War - Ed.Danesi 1960.
[2] Alberto Borgiotti, Cesar Gori, 97°
Independent Group Dive bombing 1940-1941 Athenaeum & Bizzarri
1980.
